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1. Vessel Data
Since the 1789 Act to Regulate Shipping (September 1, 1789, 1 Stat. 55), all merchant
vessels built in the United States have been required to be registered or enrolled. A ship had
to be registered if the owner intended to employ it in foreign trade, and it had to be enrolled
if it had a capacity in excess of 20 tons and was intended to be employed in the domestic
coastal and river trades. As the capacity of commercial ocean-going vessels invariably
exceeds 20 gross tons, the capacity requirement is binding for documentation to exist.1
Certificates of enrollment and registration were drawn up in triplicate. One copy was held
aboard the vessel, which was surrendered at the end of the vessel's life and submitted for
archival purposes to the Office of the Register of the Treasury or its successor agencies. The
second copy was held by the issuing customs office, and the third as a reference copy by the
Office of the Register of the Treasury or its successor agencies. Registration and enrollment
certificates provide a rich source of data on the date and place of construction, dimensions,
rig, hull material, and other basic technological details of the ship, whether the vessel was
intended for domestic use or for foreign trade, and the names of the first owners and master.
The attractiveness of such an extensive technological record will be readily apparent to
students of technological change and industry evolution. There are, however, two limitations
to be overcome. The first is that metal and wooden vessels are mixed by vessel name in these
sources, and there are far too many records of wooden vessels for the extraction of metal
vessels to be a reasonable endeavor. The second is that there was no requirement for vessel
documents to record the name of the builder, a particularly desirable piece of information.2
All surviving documents of ships built prior to W.W.I are held by the National Archives, but
it is a daunting task to systematically tabulate the records. In 1814, fire destroyed all
existing surrendered and reference certificates of enrollment and registration;3 in 1913, the
Bureau of Navigation destroyed the reference copies for vessels built between 1815 and 1913;
surrendered copies of documents held in Washington are incomplete, especially when vessels
1

Vessels between five and twenty tons had to be licensed, but few licenses from the 19th century
survive today. An act of June 7, 1918 (40 Stat. 602) extended the registration requirements. After
this date, all mechanically powered vessels, except those under 16 feet powered by an outboard
motor, were required to be numbered and recorded.
2
One can often identify the builder from a vessel's registration document when he was a co-owner
of the vessel; granting part ownership to the builder was a common way to finance part of the
ship purchase during the 18th and 19th centuries.
3
On August 24, 1814, British forces under Major General Robert Ross set fire to all the public
buildings in Washington except the Patent Office.
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were lost at sea; and many of the customs copies are scattered throughout the country in
regional offices of the National Archives. Yet despite this shrinkage of the data, the National
Archives continues to hold over 10,000 linear feet of vessel documentation records.
Fortunately, maritime historians have long had an obsession with making lists. The most
famous of these, the Lytle list (Lytle, 1932; Lytle and Holdcamper, 1952; Lytle, Holdcamper
and Mitchell, 1975) tabulates register and enrollment records for all U.S.-built steamships
from 1790 to 1868, and contains approximately 8,000 steam vessels with details of equipment
(including form of propulsion), hull material, tonnage, place built, port of first registration,
and its eventual fate. After 1868, the America Bureau of Shipping began to publish annually
complete ship registries.4 Although the Lytle list and the ABS registries are valuable, they do
not contain the name of the builder even when this was recorded on a document.
The study therefore takes as a starting point a rather fortunate find in the National
Archives. Around 1920, the Bureau of Navigation constructed a register of metal vessels built
in the United States between 1825, the year the first iron vessel was built, and 1919.5 The
register, a hand-written leather-bound volume contains the key technological details from the
vessel documents. But, remarkably in view of the work it must have entailed, the register
also lists the builder for most of the vessels. The register suffers some omissions that I have
filled from other sources. First, some of the earliest vessels, often of quasi-experimental
vessels for which legal registration requirements were not fully satisfied, are omitted.6 We
have been able to fill in these gaps with vessel descriptions from diverse sources, especially
Brown (1951) and typescript vessel lists held in various specialized manuscript collections.
Second, the register reports only merchant vessels. I have added to the register vessels built
for the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Navy by private companies using official records
provided in Bauer and Roberts (1991), Benham and Hall (1913), Canney (1993, 1995, 1998),
Conway (1979), Still (1996), and US Coast Guard (1989).
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The ABS registries are tedious to use however, because a vessel appears in every volume issued
in a year when the vessel was still registered or enrolled.
5
I have subsequently found only one reference, Heinrich (1997), to this register.
6
William M. Lytle, who was employed at the Bureau of Navigation around the time the register
was produced and who may have been responsible for it, had been particularly severe in excluding
some early vessels from the Lytle list because they lacked official documentation. Most notably,
Lytle (1932) excluded John Fitch's Steamboat, which was operating commercially in 1790 without
registration documents. The vessel is well-documented historically (see, for example, Wescott,
1857), and is particularly important as the first steamboat operated commercially anywhere in the
world (only the 1975 revision of the Lytle list includes it). Lytle attributed the first commercial
steamboat in the United States to Robert Fulton (Clermont, built 1807).
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Figure 1. Metal Vessels Launched for Civilian Use, 1825-1914. To aid
comparison with the Department of Commerce data, 370 military vessels
constructed by private yards are excluded. Department of Commerce
records allocate production vessels to year of registration or enrollment, the
data set allocates vessels to year of launching. These dates coincide in the
majority of, but not in all, cases. Source: Smith, H. G., and L.C. Brown
(1948, Table 6).

The criteria for inclusion of vessels in the final sample were as follows. Because cost-plus
contracts initiated during the Great War are of only marginal interest for the study of
industry evolution, the database excludes vessels launched after 1914. Second, the sample
was restricted to producers who launched at least one vessel in excess of the 20 gross tons
capacity required to trigger enrollment or registration.7 Third, in order to track more
precisely the dates of activity of the included firms, all metal vessels known to have been
produced by them are included regardless of gross tonnage. The restricted sample contains
exactly 4,000 vessels and 273 producers.
Figure 1 compares the number of vessels for which I have information with the US
Department of Commerce's (USDC) official tally of metal vessels built during the period. For
the period 1825-1914, the USDC tally reports 3,222 documented merchant vessels. To
7

It should be noted that not all of the vessels in our database were enrolled or registered, and
some of those that were enrolled were not required to be. We have however, retained firms where
I do not know the gross tonnage of their vessels. 57 firms, accounting for 114 boats in our records,
were excluded by the minimum size criterion. The majority of these were back-yard enthusiasts,
producing a vessel for their personal use.
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facilitate comparison with the USDC tally, the figure excludes the 370 military vessels in the
sample, all vessels under 20 gross tons capacity, and all vessels for which no gross tonnage is
available. Even so, there remains an excess of 260 merchant vessels that should have been
included in the USDC record.
I believe that, subject to the minimum size requirement, the database is the most complete
record in existence of metal shipbuilding in the United States prior to 1915. The only major
omission that I am aware is a failure to systematically include vessels constructed for export,
and which therefore were not documented in the United States. Few firms exported vessels
and, for most of those that did, export activity formed a minor part of their total production.
There are a couple of exceptions, however. Between 1878 and 1914, James Rees and Sons of
Pittsburgh, PA, produced hundreds of knock-down iron and steel steamboats for service on
South American rivers (Rees and Sons, 1913), but only fourteen of their vessels are recorded
in the United States. Marine Iron Works of Chicago, IL, also sold an unknown number of
knock-down iron vessels to South America, although in their case the majority of their export
trade consisted of the sale of machinery along with plans for wooden hulls to be built locally
(Marine Iron Works, 1902).

2. Firm histories
I have attempted to produce detailed histories for as many of the 273 recorded producers as
possible. The sources have been eclectic, employing local shipbuilding histories, country
histories and biographies, manuscript collections, contemporary newspaper accounts,
genealogical records, and personal communications with surviving relatives, representatives of
surviving firms, and archivists in local historical societies. For some small producers, I have
no information at all, while for others I have identified their pre-entry backgrounds from only
city directories indicating their profession prior to entry in the database. For most large
producers, in contrast, it was possible to construct extremely rich histories and document in
detail the way in which they entered and left the industry.
From the textual firm histories, I have attempted to code systematically the producers'
backgrounds, the dates of firm formation, entry into and exit from metal shipbuilding, and
the mode of exit. None of these tasks proved to be straightforward and it is worth discussing
at this point some of the decisions made. Before doing so, however, I need to discuss
ambiguities in defining a firm.

4

Defining Firms
There were several challenges to overcome in constructing the basic count of firms and in
assigning vessels to them. First, the source database contained many vessels assigned to
individuals, although these individuals turned out to be employed by another firm. Second, it
was not always a straightforward matter to decide when a reorganization or relocation
constituted the creation of a new producer or the continuation of the old one.
Addressing the first difficulty required only detective work. The individual to whom a vessel
had been attributed often proved to be the superintendent of construction, an owner of the
firm, or even an owner of the vessel. Often, I was able to find biographies of the individuals
that placed them in a firm at the right time. In other cases, I was able to cross-check vessel
lists from multiple sources to link the individual to a firm. Sometimes, company records
provided employee lists. And in one case, genealogical records linked multiple individuals
with the same surname to a single family. It is certain that some individuals who continue to
be named in the sample were, in fact, employed by another firm. On the other hand, I have
documented that many individual names did indeed own their own foundry, engine works, or
boatyard. My approach in this case has been to identify in the sample all individuals about
whom I am suspicious (generally individuals who appear from nowhere, build one large
vessel, and then vanish), and to conduct the statistical analyses with and without these
individual observations.
It was frequently necessary to make judgments about the boundaries between firms. Some
examples illustrate:
• On 20 July 1885, John Roach and Sons of Philadelphia, PA, declared bankruptcy in
the wake of financial strains imposed by naval contracts. The yard closed for almost a
year, putting 1,200 men out of work. Some negotiations allowed the receiver, George
Quintard, to finish some incomplete cruisers on the stocks and ensure payment for
them. The following year, after incorporation as the Delaware River Iron Shipbuilding
and Engine Works in a reorganization involving new investors, the yard reopened. The
father, John Roach, who was by now terminally ill with cancer, resigned, and the yard
re-opened with the son, John B. Roach, at the helm (Heinrich, 1997; Swann, 1965).
• In 1903, a devastating fire along the waterfront in Racine, WI, destroyed the plant of
the Racine Boat Manufacturing Company, a specialist in the construction of pleasure
boats. The site had already been getting too small for the firm and, in response to an
offer of free waterfront property, a $20,000 cash payment and tax breaks from the city
of Muskegon, MI, the firm relocated to Michigan while continuing to operate under the
Racine name. A majority of the employees moved to Muskegon, although only two
members of the management team, Walter Reynolds and Clarence Palmer, moved. In
1906, the foreman Peter Gødske, who was unhappy with the company's attempts to
expand into the construction of larger vessels, returned to Racine with a number of
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employees to continue production of pleasure boats. Gødske's plant, doing business as
the Racine Boat Company, closed some time between 1925 and 1927. In November of
1910, a boat-building combine to be known as the National Boat and Engine Company
was organized, with Walter Reynolds as its president and the Racine Boat
Manufacturing Company of Muskegon as its head company. The purpose of the
organization was to control boat production of the United States east of the Mississippi,
and subsequently to begin production of airplanes. The consolidation of the
participating companies was to be financed with a large bond issue. However, the bond
issue failed and on September 4, 1911, the Racine Boat Manufacturing Company was
closed and put in the hands of a receiver. A new syndicate, the Racine-Truscott Shell
Lake Boat Company was set up and assigned to run the Muskegon company. In March
of 1912, charges of fraud were brought against the syndicate and the consolidation
agreement was set aside. On November 28, 1915, foreclosure proceedings were started
against the syndicate and the plant went into the hands of a receiver (Gunther, 1989;
Wheeler, 1998).
• The Cleveland Ship Building Company operated a yard in Cleveland, OH from 1887
to 1898. Constrained by space, in 1898 the firm built a new yard in Lorain, OH on the
Cuyahoga River, intending to use the old yard for repair work. In 1899, the Cleveland
Ship Building Company joined the new trust being established under the name of the
American Ship Building Company, which then operated both yards for new
construction, with many of the same employees (Wright, 1969).
• In 1844, Thomas Reaney, Jacob Neafie and William Smith formed a partnership in
Philadelphia, PA, to build fire engines, boilers and stationary steam engines. However,
in that year they also launched four iron steamboats destined for export to South
America (Morrison, 1905). Smith died in 1845, and Capt. John P. Levy was invited to
join the firm. While Neafie and Levy were experienced mechanics, their social
connections and financial resources were limited. Levy brought connections and money
from his shipping activities, which facilitated the firm's subsequent expansion. In 1859,
Reaney left the firm and established a yard in Chester, PA, in partnership with his son
(Heinrich, 1997).

In the first three examples, I chose in favor of coding multiple producers. In the first case, I
relied on a decision to code any reorganized firm after bankruptcy as a new and distinct firm,
but coded the pre-entry background of the new firm as metal shipbuilding. Moreover, I
additionally coded the new firm as having taken over an existing metal shipbuilding yard.
The Racine and Muskegon companies were coded as four distinct firms. In 1903, plant and
facilities on offer in Muskegon were clearly sufficiently distinctive to induce a move. Because
age and appropriateness of plant is expected to influence firm performance, I coded the two
locations as separate producers, the latter having metal shipbuilding as a pre-entry
background. Peter Gødske's return to Racine is logically coded as a new firm created by spinoff. I coded the Racine-Truscott Shell Lake Boat Company as a distinct entity, because it
6

was formed after a bankruptcy. I did not code the abortive National Boat and Engine
Company consortium as a company distinct from the Racine Boat Manufacturing Company.
In this case, the management remained unchanged, and the planned extensive trust never got
off the ground.8
In the case of the Cleveland Ship Building Company, I relied on the principle of replication
to code each plant as a separate economic entity, although I then provide indicators that the
parent firm owned multiple plants.9 The pre-entry background for the Lorain plant is coded
as metal shipbuilding. I then decided to code all plant takeovers by the new trust companies
that were emerging at the turn of the century as new firms, again coded with a metal
shipbuilding background and takeover of existing metal yards.
In contrast, I treated the Philadelphia plant owned by various permutations of Reaney,
Neafie, Smith and Levy, as a single firm created in 1844. Although Levy joined the firm after
the company had launched its first vessels, the captain brought his connections to the firm at
a sufficiently early stage that I include his shipping background as part of the firm's preentry experience. The Chester firm formed by Reaney and his son in 1859 is a new spin-off
with metal shipbuilding as a pre-entry background, but the loss of Reaney from the
Phildelphia partnership did not persuade me to code the surviving partnership of Neafie and
Levy as a new firm.
In summary, my preference was to code more, rather than fewer producers. However, I did
not code as firm changes the many recorded instances when partners left firms and were
replaced by new partners, as long as some key partners remained in place. These criteria,
although inevitably subjective, led me as a new firm any organization where I had reason to
believe the operation of the firm had been substantively affected by a reorganization, or
where the technological capabilities of the plant were believed to be substantively different.
Key Dates
I have recorded, whenever possible, four key dates for each firm: founding year10, the years in
which the first and last metal vessels were launched11, and the year the firm went out of
8

This example illustrates that coding decisions can be dependent to some extent on the success of
new ventures. If the new consortium had become established and led to different management
practices, I would have coded November 1910 as the date of formation of a new firm.
9
Very few firms in our sample operated multiple plants.
10
It is important to distinguish this from the year of incorporation. William and Cramp and Sons,
of Philadelphia, PA, was founded as a shipbuilding firm in 1830, but incorporated only in 1872
(Heinrich, 1997; Tyler, 1958), a decade after it had begun working with iron.
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business. Because so many firms engaged in diverse manufacturing activities while also active
in shipbuilding, and because others abandoned the industry by diversifying into new
activities, there is little correlation between the year the last metal vessel was launched and
the year the firm went out of business.
The basic proxy for the date of exit from the industry is, of course, the year the last metal
vessel was launched, but it should be understood that these dates may not always be
equivalent. For example, the Continental Iron Works of Brooklyn, NY, launched its last
vessel in 1889, after 30 years in the industry. The firm had always been diversified -- in fact
even while it was making iron-clad monitors during the Civil War, it was manufacturing the
steel tubes that would make up the Croton Aqueduct -- and continued in business producing
items such as industrial boilers and construction steel until 1949. Although the apparent
industry exit date is 1889, the annual register of the American Bureau of Shipping continued
to record the firm as a manufacturer of iron vessels for another decade. Is it simply that the
ABS register is incorrect and the firm really had exited in 1889? Was the firm actively
seeking construction contracts after this date, but without success? Or was it more passive,
willing to undertake contracts if they came along without actively seeking them out? The
evidence is contradictory. On the one hand, the Continental Shipyard changed its name in
1888 to the Continental Iron Works, and Eddey (1999) plausibly argues that the name
change was to signal its movement away from "manufacturing maritime projects to
manufacturing less seaworthy iron objects." On the other hand, the Continental Iron Works
re-entered shipbuilding, albeit on a modest scale, during both World Wars. In fact, it is
common for firms to produce no vessels for a number of years, and then to reappear in the
database. Is this period of non-production an exit? Most firms repeatedly had to contend
with the small numbers problem generated by the lumpiness of production: failure to win but
a single contract could mean the difference between operating a yard at full capacity and
having no shipbuilding work at all. Survival demanded diversification, which the more
successful firms undertook with a vengeance (see Figure 2). It then follows that absence from
the industry did not necessarily mean exit from the industry.
As illustration, Figure 3 plots annual launchings by two successful producers. David Bell of
Buffalo, NY who was engaged in shipbuilding for over forty years until his death in 1903,
had launched the first iron vessel built on the Great Lakes in 1861. Reaney, Neafie and Levy

11

These are taken from the vessel database. If a firm was still producing after observation ended
in 1914, I attempted to obtain the last year of production from the textual histories. In a small
number of cases I was not able to verify a final year, and for these I coded the last year for which
I have documentary evidence of production activity as a censored observation.
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Figure 2. Printed Flyer for Harrison Loring, South Boston, MA, c.1860.
Loring launched 13 vessels between 1858 and 1891 and, like many of his
competitors, was engaged in the manufacturing of diverse products. Credit:
Eldridge Collection, Mariners Museum, Newport News, VA.

(subsequently Neafie and Levy) of Philadelphia, PA, were among the pioneers of industrialscale ship production, launching their first vessels in 1844, and surviving in the industry for
over 60 years. Both firms survived periods in which no vessels of any kind were launched by
diversifying. Bell was a major producer of steam engines, a business that generated more
revenue than his shipbuilding activities; in 1865 he had opened a locomotive factory; and he
also built wooden vessels (Tondrowski, 1990). Neafie and Levy built fire engines, boilers and
9
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Figure 3. Number of Vessels Launched: David Bell's Steam Engine
Works, Buffalo NY (1861-1903) and Neafie & Levy, Philadelphia, PA
(1844-1907).

stationary steam engines, and made a steadier living manufacturing propellers for other
yards, having obtained the rights to Richard Loper's design because of the inventor's
friendship with John Levy. In the particularly dark days after the financial panic of 1873, the
firm even manufactured refrigerating equipment (Heinrich, 1997).
Unless one can document that a firm dismantled its shipbuilding facilities in the process of
diversifying out of the industry, the only confirmation that a firm has permanently exited is
when the firm itself has folded. But in too many cases for such confirmation to be helpful,
firm closure takes place many years after the last vessel was launched:
• The Sweeney Brothers of Jeffersonville, IN, launched just a single metal vessel, in
1891, but continued to build wooden vessels until they sold the yard in 1938 (Jeffboat
LLC, 2001).
• The Tredegar Iron Works of Richmond, VA, launched their last vessel in 1867 but
continued to be a successful enterprise for another 90 years, producing munitions for
two world wars and becoming the oldest surviving iron works south of the Potomac
river (Gardner, 2001).

While I use the last year of launching as a proxy for the year of exit, it may also make sense
to think about exit in probabilistic terms. That is, one could imagine exit to be ceteris
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paribus more likely the longer a firm has gone without launching a vessel. In this way, a firm
may be viewed probabilistically as an exit even if it re-enters at a later stage.12
Producer Backgrounds
In coding the pre-entry backgrounds of shipbuilders, my primary focus has been on
distinguishing firms that entered after gaining experience in manufacturing iron and steel
products, wooden vessels, or shipping13 (Figure 4 provides the distribution of firms across
categories). Each background offered different advantages. Manufacturers of iron products
were skilled in handling and shaping a relatively new industrial material. Builders of wooden
vessels were experienced in hull design, marketing vessels, and had often earned a solid
reputation for quality and reliability among vessel buyers. Entrants from the shipping
industry had a clear understanding of buyers' needs, extensive contacts in the using industry,
and in some cases they provided a market for their own output.14
Founders of firms often had pre-entry experience in various fields, and when this experience
was significant, multiple coding was made. Firms that lacked relevant experience, hired it, or
worked in close collaboration with firms having complementary experience, as the following
examples attest:
• In the mid 1840s, Philadelphia engine-builders Reaney, Neafie, and Levy began to
make contact with shipbuilders to help design ships and supervise the bending and
mounting of frames. Because Reaney, Neafie and Levy had experience in metal work
and engine work, along with the rights to the Loper propeller, collaboration with them
was attractive to local shipbuilders (Heinrich, 1997).
• Charles Cramp, heir to Philadelphia wooden shipbuilding enterprise founded in 1825
by his father, William Cramp, served his apprenticeship at the local shipyard of his
maternal uncle, Jacob Birely, between 1844 and 1846. Birely was at this time buying his
engines from Reaney, Neafie and Levy, and was to launch his own iron boat only two
years later. On returning as a master shipbuilder to his father's yard, Cramp
immediately entered into close collaboration with the engine builders, and began to
12

This probabilistic treatment has not been carried out.
Among those firms whose background has been identified, alternative routes of entry are rare.
14
In many cases of entrants with a background in metal work, I have further been able to confirm
that the they manufactured steam engines. In view both of the importance of engine-building to
shipbuilding and its technical difficulty, I have coded this activity as a sub-class of foundry work
that merits particular attention. Most builders of wooden vessels were not equipped to
manufacture engines and, although many operated small foundries to manufacture custom iron
fittings, the normal practice was to sub-contract the major machinery to specialists.
13
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Figure 4. Number of Firms by Prior Background. Categories are not
mutually exclusive. A: Wooden vessel construction. B: Iron works, including
foundries, rolling mills, steam engine manufacturers, manufacturers of railcars
and locomotives, and general ironware manufacturers. C: Transportation
sector, including railroads, shipping, and dredging. D: Iron or steel
shipbuilding. E: Firm acquired on entry an existing iron or steel shipyard. F:
Prior background unknown.
experiment with screw propulsion. In 1846 he launched the country's first screw tug,
Sampson, with the engine built by Reaney, Neafie and Levy. (Buell, 1906; Johnson,
1904).
• Alexander McDougall (1845-1923) began sailing at the age of 16, after limited
schooling and being apprenticed as a blacksmith. By 1863 he had risen to second mate
on a schooner, and in 1871 he became captain of the Japan, which in the winter of
1870-71 was one of three iron vessels being built for the Anchor Line by the William
King's iron works in Buffalo, NY.15 In his capacity as captain of the Japan, McDougall
15

Most accounts call this firm the (Sidney) Shepard Iron Works, a firm established in 1848.
Shephard relinquished active management of the firm in 1865, and William J. King Jr. had
bought a majority share of the firm by 1871. The Anchor Line vessels were built at King's yard
under the oversight of the wooden shipbuilding firm of Gibson and Craig. Shephard must have
retained a minority interest in the firm: it is recorded that in 1885 he transferred to a son, C.
Sidney Shepard, his interest in the old firm. By the late 1880s, the firm was owned by H.G.
Trout, who had learned his trade at the King works, and then leased the property. He was a
major supplier of propellers using what was known as the "Trout" pattern. In addition, the
company supplied marine engines and other manufactured machinery (Buffalo Courier, 1890;
Hall, 1895, vol 1, pp. 592-3; Larned, 1911, vol. 2 pp. 3-4).
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spent the winter supervising construction at the yard. When shipping business was slow
during the mid 1870's, McDougall went into the fishing business in partnership with
Alexander Clark of Collingwood, and in the winter of 1875-6, he built the 58-foot
wooden steam fish tug Siskiwit. Then, in 1879, shipowner Thomas Wilson, who had
sailed with McDougall on the Meteor, asked McDougall to supervise construction of the
steamer Hiawatha and the schooner-barge Minnehaha, which were being built for him at
the Linn and Craig yard in Gibralter, MI. Between 1878 and 1881, McDougall
commanded the Hiawatha. It was during this period he gave thought to barge design,
and on May 24, 1881 he was granted patent 241,813 for a towboat with a cylindrical
hull (possibly influenced by the design of the hull built to transport Cleopatra's Needle
between Egypt and London, which McDougall had an opportunity to view on a visit to
England in 1873). Design improvements, most importantly a shift from wood to iron or
steel, led to a second patent, 259,889 on June 20, 1882. The familiar bow shape of the
whaleback design is evident in this second patent. Further design changes during the
subsequent decade led to patents in December 1883 (no. 393,997) and June 1890 (nos.
429,467 and 429, 468). Patent 429,467 was the design for McDougall's first vessel,
launched in 1888; while 429,468 was the basic design for nearly all the subsequent
whalebacks built by McDougall. So, when McDougall built his first steel vessel in
Duluth, MN, he could draw on his experiences as blacksmith, supervisor of iron and
wooden ship construction, builder of a wooden vessel, and captain of iron steamers.
Nonetheless, he contracted out the difficult parts of his boat construction. In particular,
the 101's conoidal bow and stern were fabricated at the Pusey & Jones Shipbuilding
Company of Wilmington, DE. Only the straight mid section of the hull was built
locally. In 1890, after securing financing from Colgate Hoyt of New York, who
represented the John D. Rockefeller interests, and other New York financiers,
McDougall established the American Steel Barge Company. He again looked elsewhere
for expertise. In particular, he hired Joseph Kidd, who had been running his own iron
works for several years in Linwood, PA. Kidd was an English shipbuilder from the
Tyne. He had for eight years served as foreman for John Roach, one of the country's
most successful large-scale shipbuilders, and certainly its most outspoken. Kidd then
established his own firm, with Roach's assistance. He had been engaged for several years
manufacturing iron conductors for the Union Line cable-roads in Philadelphia, and had
also built several modest iron vessels. By the time McDougall approached Kidd, he had
won contracts for two government lightships, but was not succeeding financially.
McDougall induced Kidd to close his firm and take the position of Superintendent for
$200 per month. (Ashmead, 1884; McDougall, 1892, 1968)

Inevitably, some judgment has to be made to exclude certain experiences. My choice in these
instances was to favor the dominant experience, rather than code all known experiences,
however slight. Thus, William Cramp and Sons has wooden shipbuilding as pre-entry
experience, and the American Steam Barge Company has shipping coded as its pre-entry
experience. But I cannot claim to have been dogmatic about this decision: recall that
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Figure 5. Number of Firms by Exit Destination. Categories are mutually
exclusive. A: Firm declared bankruptcy, or known to be unprofitable at
time of closure. B: Entered one of the new shipbuilding holding companies.
C: Exit by merger. D: Owner died or retired. E: Firm continued operating
in another industry (often the one from which it had originally entered). G:
exit destination known, but non-standard. H: Exit destination unknown. J:
No exit (firms still produces metal vessels today).

Reaney, Neafie and Levy are recorded with backgrounds in both engine-building and
shipping.
Modes of Exit16
Eight categories of exit destination have been coded: bankruptcy/unprofitable; exit into one
of the shipbuilding trusts; merger; owner died or retired, firm abandoned shipbuilding but
continued in another industry; firm sold; non-standard motivation for exit; and destination
unknown. The distribution of exit destination by category are given in Figure 5. In many
cases, I just do not know what happened to the firm – they simply vanish from the database.
Of those for which I have information, 53 percent continued in business, having diversified
out of iron or steel shipbuilding. In the majority of these cases, the firm reverted to the
activity it had undertaken both before and during its life as a metal shipbuilder. Nonetheless,
in a sizable minority of cases, the firm ceased to exit contemporaneously with its exit from
shipbuilding: the firm was unprofitable and closed, or bankruptcy was formally declared (20
percent); the firm was sold, without there being documentary evidence that the owner was
16

The mode of exit was not studied in Thompson (2005).
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Figure 6. The first Winans Cigar Boat, 1858. Crisafulli (2001) notes the
similarity between this boat and Jules Verne's Nautilius, arguing that Verne
would undoubtedly have seen the Winans design. Source: The Illustrated London
News, November 27, 1858.

retiring or the firm was insolvent (9 percent); or the firm exited by merger or into one of the
trust companies being formed at the end of the 19th century (9 percent); or the owner died or
retired (6 percent).
In two cases, I coded the exit destination as non-standard. One was the demise by fire,
already mentioned, of the Racine Boat Manufacturing Company of Racine, WI. The second,
the Winans Brothers, is more interesting:
• The Winans brothers were sons of Ross Winans, the railway pioneer. Ross Winans
had begun his engineering life in 1830 as an assistant to Phineas Davis, who in 1825 had
been involved in the construction of the first American iron vessel, Codorus. Winans
eventually went into business on his own with the founding of the Winans Locomotive
Works. His son Thomas became an active collaborator around 1840. The family
accumulated considerable wealth overseeing railway development for the Russian
Government, traveling frequently to Russia. In 1858 the Winans brothers launched a
novel ship into Baltimore harbor. Known as the cigar ship, it was built in two sections
with a radial propeller amidships joined by a shroud ring over the propeller (see Figure
6). Power was provided on a single shaft by two railroad steam engines, one in each
hull. The superstructure consisted of a narrow deck with railings, a lookout tower atop
the propeller shroud, and narrow smokestacks on each hull. The helmsman sat in a
compartment in the bow with a small, forward-looking view port. The boat made

15

several trial trips, but was never put into commercial use. Ross Winans designed the
novel cigar boat, but Thomas Winans was responsible for its construction (Thomas'
brother was at the time in Russia carrying out the contracts the family had won). Plans
were laid for a second vessel. But in 1861 Ross Winans, a southern sympathizer, built a
self-propelled steam gun. It was loaded on a B&O car bound for Harper's Ferry but was
intercepted by the Federal troops and dismantled. Winans was arrested for his part in
the affair and jailed until November 1862. After his release, the Winans family moved
to Europe. They first tried to persuade the Russian government to purchase the design
for their Navy, and two vessels were built in St. Petersburg. The Russians did not bite,
and a third vessel was launched in La Havre in 1865. Two Winans vessels eventually
made their way to England and remained moored in Southampton until late in the
century when they were sold for scrap (Shugg, 1998; Crisafulli, 2001).

Compared with pre-entry backgrounds, there were relatively few instances in which
judgments had to be made about coding the exit destination. But two similar examples, in
which the death of an owner is shortly followed by bankruptcy but in which different
assignments were made, may shed light on those judgments that were made.
• After John B. Roach assumed the presidency of his father's yard in 1885, the firm was
incorporated under the name of the Delaware River Iron Shipbuilding and Engines
Works. Over the next, 22 years, the firm launched 75 vessels for a total 18,2,656 tons,
remaining one of the most active producers in the country. The yard was receiving
fewer orders by the turn of the century, and in 1903 it closed for a while, but by 1906,
business picked up. Seven vessels were launched in 1906 and 1907, for a total of 21,073
tons, far exceeding the firm's lifetime average annual production rate of 8,302 tons per
year. Although orders dropped again in later 1907, and the yard closed temporarily,
there is no evidence suggesting that conditions were much different than had previously
been experienced. However, John B. Roach died in 1908, and his family quickly
announced that they no longer wished to continue production. The yard entered
receivership only five months after Roach's death. (Heinrich, 1997; Swann, 1965)
• In 1883, the Navy began to seek bids from a new fleet of steel ships, and a new yard,
the American Shipbuilding Company,17 was established in Philadelphia, PA, to secure
some of these contracts. It was financed by New York interests with $250,000, and
placed under the direction of Lieutenant-Commander H.H. Gorringe who had earned
fame in 1880 by shipping Cleapoatra's needle from Egypt to Central Park. Gorringe
hired 700 craftsmen, issued subcontracts for engines to Neafie and Levy, and hired
foremen who had learned their trade at John Roach's yard. Unfortunately for Gorringe,
a quarrel developed between him and the secretary of the navy, Chandler. Gorringe
advocated the cause of free ships, because he was more interested in the US having a
17

This firm is unrelated to the American Ship Building Company formed by the merger of a
number of large producers in the Great Lakes region in 1899.
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strong merchant marine than a strong shipbuilding industry. Chandler was a
protectionist. In a letter to Gorringe, Chandler wrote that "there is no objection to the
public expression by a naval officer of his unpurchased opinions on any subject of
general interest." Gorringe took the word "unpurchased" as a slander and resigned from
the navy. Two events conspired to close the firm only two years after its creation. First
Gorringe died in 1885 after attempting to board a moving train. Second, the firm's
financial prospects were severely shaken by its failure to win any navy contracts, even
though it had managed to launch a dozen private vessels, and financing was withdrawn
after 1885 (Johnson, 1904; Heinrich, 1997).

In the former case, I coded the exit destination as death of owner, and in the latter as
bankruptcy. The different choices result from my interpretation of the textual histories. In
the case of Gorringe's company, I concluded that continued financing was not conditional on
Gorringe's participation—he had been central to the strategy of winning Navy contracts, but
that strategy had already fallen apart by the time of his death. Gorringe also had no
particularly rare shipbuilding talent. In contrast, John B. Roach had become accustomed to
the cyclical nature of the demand for new construction over 35 years in the business; he had
even closed the yard temporarily on more than one occasion. My reading is that Roach
would not have been defeated by what appeared to be a quite typical lapse in new orders in
late 1907, and that the family's decision to close the firm was directly predicated on Roach's
death.

3. Coverage and Selection Bias
In industrial competition, as in war, history is written by, or for, the winners. Firms for
which I have been able to code reliably their backgrounds and their destinations after exit
from metal shipbuilding are consequently more likely to be among the successful. Table 1
provides some summary data on firm duration, mean vessel size and total production
according to whether it has been possible to code on background and exit. Firms for which I
have adequate histories produced many more, and larger, vessels, and survived on average
five times as long as the average uncoded firm.
The differences are sufficiently large that, although I have been able to completely code for
background and exit destination for only a little over 60 percent of the firms that appear in
the database, the contribution of the coded firms to vessel production is much larger. As
Table 2, shows, the sample coverage of the coded firms, whether measured by number of
vessels produced, tons of production, or the number of firm x year observations in the panel,
is about 90 percent.
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NO. OF
FIRMS

2.3

21.5

3.4

21.4

2.4

18.9

14.6

NO. OF
VESSELS
BUILT

657

35,615

4,711

35,422

694

31,779

23,750

FIRM
OUTPUT
(GROSS
TONS)

FIRM AVERAGES

GROUP TOTALS

361

3,639

355

3,645

167

3,833

4,000

126

1,636

1,367

1,634

291

1,668

1,622

2.4

14.5

3.2

14.5

2.4

12.9

10.2

AVERAGE
AVERAGE
NO. OF
VESSEL SIZE
VESSELS
DURATION
(GROSS
BUILT
(YEARS)
TONS)

TABLE 1
Group and Firm Means, By Data Availability

TABLE 2
Sample Coverage by Data Availability
PERCENTAGE OF TOTALS WITH . .

NO. OF FIRMS
NO. OF VESSELS
TONS PRODUCTION
OBSERVATION YEARSa
a

BACKGROUND
KNOWN

TYPE OF EXIT
KNOWN

BACKGROUND AND
TYPE OF EXIT KNOWN

74.4
95.8
98.5
94.0

62.3
91.1
91.8
88.5

61.9
90.1
91.7
88.0

The product of average firm life and number of firms.

While it is gratifying to be able to account for so much of the production, the bias towards
the more successful firms evidenced in the coverage of the textual histories raises serious
questions about sample selection bias in statistical analyses. Simply including "unknown" as
one of the categories into which a firm may fall is problematic when these categories are used
as regressors. For example, negative idiosyncratic shocks cutting short the life of a firm or
reducing its output, increase the likelihood that the firm falls into the "unknown" category.
Survival analysis on the dataset is therefore especially susceptible to endogeneity problems.
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